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Defending What From Whom? Debating Citizen Disengagement*  
 
Joshua Forstenzer 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This article constitutes a pointed theoretical intervention in the debate opposing 
Richards and Smith to Flinders on the question of citizen disengagement. Its main 
contention is that Richards and Smith offer a straw man argument against Flinders 
by identifying him with positions he does not hold. It thus shows that Richards and 
Smith falsely identify Flinders with the following positions: (i) there is no need for a 
m  ǯ; (ii)          ǯ  
for democratic participation; (iii) the problem with British politics is that there is 
too much democracy and accountability. Finally, the article closes by identifying 
points of genuine tension between the Richards/Smith position and that defended 
by Flinders. 
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Introduction 
        ǯ In Defence of Politics, a debate about 
citizen disengagement in contemporary democracy has recently emerged within the 
pages of this journal. Matthew Flinders, with his articles and his influential book, 
Defending Politics, has provided the fulcrum for this debate.1 In these, Flinders 
diagnoses the problem of political disengagement in twenty-first century liberal  Ǯǯe for and 
what their political leaders can actually deliver. He goes on to argue for a re-
evaluation of democratic politics along the following lines:  
 Ǯ1. The need for a more muscular and honest form of democratic politics; 
2. An emphasis on the public being part of the problem and part of the cure; 
and 
3. The need to view politics as a counterweight to the market and not the 
basis of the market.ǯ2  
 
In purported response, David Richards and Martin Smith have argued against Ǯ-ǯ   racy that broadly seek the preservation of the 
British Political Tradition (the BPT) in its current state.3 That is to say, they reject 
the claim that they ascribe Ȃ incorrectly, I will argue Ȃ to Flinders, according to 
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which political disengagement is only    ǯ   
the successes of the current system. Instead, they argue that this disengagement is 
caused by distrust in a set of institutions (that is, the BPT) that is failing at delivering 
the basics of democracy, namely,     Ǯ ȏǥȐ 
confidence first in parties being able to represent their interests (and that     Ǯ   ǯȌǡ       
difference.ǯ4 As a result, they conclude that greater efforts should be made, making 
use of technological innovations, to enable citizen participation in representative 
democracy. 
 
These respective arguments are predominantly made on empirical grounds. In other 
words, the authors under discussion seek to establish the cause of political 
disengagement, and, while they agree about the existence of an expectations gap, 
Richards and Smith take themselves to be disagreeing with Flinders about what 
precisely causes it. In their view, this disagreement also leads to divergent 
normative agendas: superficially, one that seems to call for less democracy (that is, 
according to them, 	ǯȌȋǡ their own). 
 
Although the nature of this dispute seems straightforward, I remain unconvinced as 
to the depth of this disagreement. My main contention is that Richards and Smith 
offer a straw man argument against Flinders by identifying him with positions he 
does not hold. I will thus show that Richards and Smith falsely identify Flinders with 
the following positions: (i) there is no ǯ
democratic and governance arrangements; (ii) the problem of citizen      ǯ    
participation; (iii) the problem with British politics is that there is too much 
democracy and accountability.  I will address these in turn before finally underlining 
where real disagreement between these authors is to be found, thus suggesting 
where fruitful debate on the vital issue of democratic reform ought to concentrate.  
 
 
What We Ought to Do: When Disagreement is Mere Misunderstanding 
 
It is my claim that Richards and Smith mistakenly associate Flindersǯ with Ǯa 
rejection of the need for a major overhaul in the ǯ   
governance arrangements.ǯ5      	ǯ   of 
defending politics aims for a fuller appreciation of the art of representative 
democratic politics. It is also true that this leads Flinders to defend those engaged in 
the arena of politics and to predominantly focus on culture-change (as opposed to 
institutional change) to solve the problem of citizen disengagement. However, it is 
incorrect to conclude from this that Flinders definitely rejects the need for major 
change in the British political context. Allow me to show how this mistake takes two 
forms:  
 
- Scope: Although Flinders clearly writes in a manner that is well informed by 
the British political context, the scope of his work is broader, since it aims at 
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discussing contemporary liberal democracy in its general form, rather than 
any of its specific forms.6 
 
- Consequences: Flinders does call for a renewal of the democratic faith within 
the citizenry, as well as a deepened appreciation of the costs and limitations 
involved in actually doing politics. However, nowhere does Flinders exclude 
the need for meaningful institutional change within existing liberal 
democracies. Even though he does not discuss specific plans for reform in the 
body of work under discussion, failure to endorse a specific project is by no 
means a negation of all such projects. Moreover, one might infer from 	ǯ        ǡ  ǡ
climate change, and the media that he recognises the need for significant 
changes in political governance and institutions in contemporary liberal 
democracies. The fact that his focus in this intellectual project is not on the 
first order political questions (for example: What policies should we adopt? 
What set of institutions should we use? What power sharing agreements are 
we to live under?), but on the second order (such as: How are we to think 
about politics? How are to conceive of democratic citizenship? In what terms 
are we to engage in political discourse?), does not imply that first order ǤǡǡǮǯ7 
re	ǯ
emphasis on the second order issues of democratic self-conception and 
deliberative practices.8 At the very least, it seems plain wrong to read 
Flinders as maintaining that culture-change alone within the citizenry will do 
all of the work in solving citizen disengagement. It therefore follows that 
Flinders does not pre-emptively reject the need for any deeper institutional 
change. He merely leaves his response to this first order question under-
determined.  
 
In short, Flinders does not explicitly reject attempts at reforming democratic and 
governance arrangements, nor does he offer his own unique preferred set of 
curative institutional reforms. Rather, he remains agnostic on the matter. Richards 
and Smith do not: they offer a more ambitious institutional agenda. But this does not 	ǯǡ
between proposing a plan and merely not offering one. 
  
 
What We Ought To Think: Demand/Supply an Unhelpful Dichotomy 
 
One piece of conceptual artillery that lends credence to the existence of a 
meaningful disagreement between the positions held by Flinders and Smith and 
Richards     Ǯǯ  Ǯǯ ccounts of citizen 
disengagement. Indeed, by defining themselves in staunch opposition to him, 
Richards and Smith suggest that Flinders holds the view according to which the         ǯ   
democratic participation, because he prefers Ǯ-ǯto Ǯsupply-sideǯ accounts 
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of citizen disengagement.9 Yet, I will show that, once properly contextualised, this 
too suggests a mistaken 	ǯ.  
 
In Defending Politics, Flinders makes significant use of the idea that we can explain ǮǯǮǯǤǮǮǯ
governors and the governed can be achieved in three main ways: 
 
Option 1: increasing supply [of public good] (moving the bottom-bar up); 
Option 2: reducing demand [for public goods] (moving the top-bar down); or, 
Option 3: a combination of Options 1 and 2 (close the gap from above and below).ǯ10 
 
Flinders then goes on to argue that the twenty-first century demands a science of 
politics that will undoubtedly focus on Option 2, Ǯor more realistically Option 3ǯ, 
because he believes the desires of the public to be too insatiable, our problems too 
complex, and available resources insufficient to meaningfully satisfy public demand 
for public goods. Ultimately, he concludes that Ǯ[s]aving politics from itself and 
embracing a more honest account of politics therefore demands accepting that 
focusing on supply is less important now than focusing on demand.ǯ11  
 
Richards and Smith maintain that significant work can be done to reduce the 
expectations gap by introducing greater democratic engagement of the citizenry in 
political decision-making. They thus stress the importance of democratic supply 
over that of demand Ȃ hence, the apparent disagreement.  
 
However, I maintain that this is no real disagreement at all. Even though Richards 
and Smith take Flinders to be their central opponent, there is a crucial difference in 
their respective understandings   ǮǯȀǯǯ Ǥ   ǡ  	ǯ ǡ      ions and        ǣ Ǯǯ            Ǯǯ   ǯǤǡhis        ǣ Ǯǯ   Ǯǯ
citizenryǯ    as democratic agents.12 In other words, Richards and 
Smith ǮǯȀǮǯǡ
whereas Flinders conceives of it in terms of the relationship between citizen 
expectations and the political capacity to deliver public goods.  
 
Therefore, when Flinders claims that our efforts should focus on the demand-side of 
the equation, he is not referring to the need to keep the citizenry (as opposed to 
representatives) out of the political process of collective decision-making, but to the 
need for the public to countenance the actual capacity of any political arrangement 
to de  Ǥ   ǡ       ǯ
insatiable demand for public goods is an important factor in accounting for citizen 
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disengagement, he does not claim that the problem of citizen disengagement is ǯnd for democratic participation. 
 
Thus,  ǮǯȀ Ǯǯ ǡ   specific debate, seems to obscure 
more than it enlightens, since it suggests that all concerned authors understand this 
dichotomy in like manner, when they simply do not. 
 
 
What We Ought To Say: Distinguishing How from What 
 
Ultimately, I think that Richards and Smith take themselves to be disputing Flinders 
because, in their eyes, ǮFlinders suggests there is too much democracy and 
accountability in the UK.ǯ13  
 
The formulations used by Flinders do often suggest that the problem with 
contemporary democracy is too much democracy and accountability (that is, a 
politically under-educated public, an overly aggressive media culture, and overly 
bureaucratic accountability mechanisms). However, if one reads his articles and 
book on the subject in their entirety it becomes clear that, in his view, it is not so 
much that there is too much democracy or accountability, but rather that there is 
too much of the wrong kind of democracy and accountability. For example, he 
writes: Ǯ[T]he problem with hyper-democracy is too much of a shallow, disengaged, 
and generally aggressive form of individualized market-democracy and too 
little of a deeper and more socially embedded model based on active and 
engaged citizenship. We need less shouting and more listening, less 
pessimism and more optimism, but most of all we need more people Ȃ from a 
broader range of backgrounds Ȃ to step into the arena in order to 
demonstrate just why democratic politics matters.ǯ14  
 
This distinction between too much democracy and accountability and too much of 
the wrong kind of democracy and accountability forms 	ǯ  Ǯǯ ǮǯǤ That is why a greater degree of clarity in the use of this language might 
help in refocusing this discussion as it goes forward. 
 
 
Conclusion: What is Left to Discuss  
 
In this article, I have endeavoured to show that much of the presumed disagreement 
between Flinders and Richards and Smith is not as substantive as it may at first 
appear, because Richards and Smith mistakenly associate Flinders with positions he 
does not hold. Therefore, from a normative standpoint, it ought to be clear that we 
need not necessarily pit Flindersǯ second-order conception of engaged citizenship    ǯ first order democratic institutional reformist 
proposals. We may even see them as potentially complimentary, since greater 
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democratic participation requires and might hopefully yield a more politically 
literate citizenry. Yet, it is worth pointing out that points of genuine tension and 
potential contradiction between these authors remain. These are as follows: 
 
(a) Priority: 	ǯ
to cultural change in addressing citizen disengagement, while Richards and 
Smith give priority to institutional change. 
(b) Cynicism: Flinders claims that widespread cynicism among the citizenry 
about the political class is both unfounded and detrimental to democratic 
citizen engagement, while Richards and Smith claim that this cynicism is not 
only well founded but also spurs on deeper levels of democratic scrutiny 
within the citizenry.  
(c) Blame: Flinders insists on the need to overcome blame culture in politics, yet 
he appears to displace this blame upon citizens for failing to become Ǯmen 
and women in the arena,ǯ while Richards and Smith blame the BPT (that is, 
existing institutions instead of politicians or citizens) for failing to earn the 
trust of the citizenry.  
(d) What Counts as Politics: Even though Flinders and Richards and Smith agree 
on the need for renewal in the ways of doing politics, they seem to disagree 
about the methods of accommodating such novel forms of political action, 
with Flinders seemingly favouring the more formal avenues and Richards 
and Smith wholeheartedly embracing informal sites of political engagement. 
(e) Citizenship as a Social Identity: At the core of this discussion lies the question 
of how we account for the behaviour of citizens qua citizens (that is to say, 
how citizens act when they engage with any political aspect of their lifeworld 
as citizens, as opposed to    ȌǤ 	ǯ    ǯ    Ǯ ǯ      social identity of the 
citizen Ȃ the former suggesting a more economistic model and the latter a 
more pro-social and democratic one. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
* I wish to extend my warmest thanks to Kate Dommett for reading a previous 
version of this paper and offering insightful comments and vivacious discussion. Of 
course, all errors and shortcomings that might remain are entirely of my own 
making. 
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